Lacan?s Construction and Deconstruction of the Double-Mirror Device by Stijn Vanheule
HYPOTHESIS ANDTHEORY ARTICLE
published: 13 September 2011
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00209
Lacan’s construction and deconstruction of the
double-mirror device
StijnVanheule*
Department of Psychoanalysis and Clinical Consulting, Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium
Edited by:
Pierre-Henri Castel, Centre National
de la Recherche Scientiﬁque, France
Reviewed by:
Lewis Kirshner, Harvard Medical
School, USA
Dany Michel Nobus, Brunel
University, UK
*Correspondence:
Stijn Vanheule, Department of
Psychoanalysis and Clinical
Consulting, Ghent University,
H. Dunantlaan 2, B-9000 Ghent,
Belgium.
e-mail: stijn.vanheule @ugent.be
In the 1950s Jacques Lacan developed a set-up with a concave mirror and a plane mir-
ror, based on which he described the nature of human identiﬁcation. He also formulated
ideas on how psychoanalysis, qua clinical practice, responds to identiﬁcation. In this paper
Lacan’s schema of the two mirrors is described in detail and the theoretical line of reason-
ing he aimed to articulate with aid of this spatial model is discussed. It is argued that Lacan
developed his double-mirror device to clarify the relationship between the drive, the ego,
the ideal ego, the ego-ideal, the other, and the Other.This model helped Lacan describe the
dynamics of identiﬁcation and explain how psychoanalytic treatment works. He argued that
byworkingwith free association, psychoanalysis aims to articulate unconscious desire, and
bypass the tendency of the ego for misrecognition. The reasons why Lacan stressed the
limits of his double-mirror model and no longer considered it useful from the early 1960s
onward are examined. It is argued that his concept of the gaze, which he qualiﬁes as a
so-called “object a,” prompted Lacan move away from his double-mirror set-up. In those
years Lacan gradually began to study the tension between drive and signiﬁer. The schema
of the two mirrors, by contrast, focused on the tension between image and signiﬁer, and
missed the point Lacan aimed to address in this new era of his work.
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INTRODUCTION
In the 1950s Jacques Lacan developed a device with a concave mir-
ror and a plane mirror (Figure 1) in order to discuss the nature
of human identiﬁcation and formulate ideas on how psychoanaly-
sis, qua clinical practice, responds to identiﬁcation. In this paper I
ﬁrst examine Lacan’s double-mirror device, also called “the opti-
cal model of the ideals of the person” (Lacan, 1966, p. 859), and
describe the theoretical line of reasoning he aimed to articulate
with aid of this spatial model. Lacan developed this device to clar-
ify the relationship between the ego, the drive, the other, and the
Other, with the aim of understanding the role of ideals and iden-
tiﬁcation therein. Next, I discuss the reasons why, from the early
1960s on, Lacan (1964, 2004b, 2006e) stressed the limits of his
double-mirror model and no longer considered it useful. Indeed,
as he introduced his concept of the “object a,” and discussed the
role played by the gaze in relation to subjectivity, Lacan no longer
believed that the schema of the two mirrors grasped what is really
at stake in psychoanalysis. For this reason he switched to different
models of subjectivity in which the tension between image and
signiﬁer no longer stands to the fore, but the relationship between
signiﬁer and drive/jouissance is emphasized.
ON THE ANTECEDENT OF THE DOUBLE-MIRROR SET-UP: THE
MIRROR STAGE
Lacan discussed and constructed his double-mirror apparatus
(Figure 1) during his ﬁrst seminar (Lacan, 1988a). Over numerous
sessions he argued that, mediated by language, identiﬁcation con-
sists of adopting images that serve the purpose of drive-regulation.
However, the idea that identiﬁcation follows amirror-like logic can
be found in his earlier work. For example, in his doctoral thesis
where paranoia is discussed and psychoanalysis is only mentioned
as one theoretical framework next to many others, Lacan (1932)
made use of mirror imagery to characterize identiﬁcation (Van-
heule, 2011). In this thesis Lacan discussed the case of a paranoid
patient, Aimée, suggesting that she is overwhelmed and captivated
by her close relationships with certain others. For example, in
terms of her relationship with a colleague, Lacan states that her
actions “contrast with those of our subject ‘like an object to its
mirror image”’ (Lacan, 1932, p. 226).
The ﬁrst systematic theory of the role images and mirror
processes play in identiﬁcation can be found in “The Mirror Stage
as formative of the function of the I as revealed in psychoanalytic
experience” (Lacan, 2006b). This text is the revised version of a
paper Lacan presented in 1936 at the 14th IPA conference. At that
time, Lacan’s text was not included in the conference proceedings,
possibly because he was annoyed by Ernest Jones’s interruption of
his speech due of time constraints (Roudinesco, 1994). The text
was published 13 years later, and later slightly revised for a lecture
at the British Psycho-Analytical Society (Lacan, 1953).
A crucial thesis in the 1949 version of the paper is that the
cognitive capacity of recognizing one’s own image in a mirror,
which develops between the age of 6 and 18months, produces an
experience of satisfaction and makes up the basis of a broader
tendency to approach the world in terms of (self-) recognition1.
1For excellent discussions of Lacan’s text on the mirror stage see Muller (1985, 2000)
and Nobus (1998).
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FIGURE 1 | Lacan’s double-mirror device (Lacan, 2006e). Reprinted from
ECRITS by Jacques Lacan, translated by Bruce Fink. English translation
copyright © 2006, 2002 by W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. Used with
permission of the publisher, W. W. Norton & Company, Inc.
The developmental period during which this self-recognition ﬁrst
takes place is called “the mirror stage.” In Lacan’s line of reasoning
the “I” is then “precipitated in a primordial form” (Lacan, 2006b,
p. 76),meaning that by qualifying an external image as a reﬂection
of oneself, and by identifying with it, the ego is constituted. In this
line of reasoning the ego is above all based on a specular image;
on the perception of the body as a Gestalt in an external reﬂective
surface. In fact, what is typical of the mirror stage is that the child
shifts from a fragmented experience of the body to the perception
of the body as a unity. Lacan (2006b) believed that this experience
of the body as a unity makes up the basis of any self-experience,
and stressed that it installs an generalized search for unity in the
world, which actually distorts the experience of reality. Indeed, in
his discussion of the mirror stage Lacan does not simply synthe-
size research of his contemporaries in developmental psychology,
like Köhler and Baldwin, but stresses that any identiﬁcation with a
self-image serves a defensive aim: by focusing on the image of who
one is and what one is capable of, an individual actually denies
his own incapacity and internal chaos, and thus installs a tendency
toward misrecognition. An example Lacan uses to illustrate this
idea is that of the infant who cannot yet walk or stand without a
prop, but becomes excited by the brief moments it can abandon
the prop. The child sees itself as standing upright, as having over-
come its own inability, while in reality it is not yet mastering its
own movement. By anticipating what he will later master and see-
ing himself as if he were already mastering the developmental task
he is confronted with, the child misrecognizes his actual inability.
Such anticipation offers a feeling of competency and clearly serves
a developmental focus (Lacan, 2006a), but also installs a tendency
to more broadly misrecognize inconsistency and failure (Lacan,
2006b). Indeed, in Lacan’s (2006b, p. 78) view, the body image
the child creates provides “an ‘orthopedic’ form of its totality,” and
more broadly produces the experience of constancy together with
the repression of inconsistency.
What this ﬁrst theory on mirror processes states is that
the ego, and consistency at the level of self-experience, take
shape by recognizing one’s self-image in the outside world, and
by identifying with it. This theory is largely inspired by early
twentieth-century Gestalt psychology and stresses both the for-
mative and defensive role of images, apart from the inﬂuences
of language and socio-cultural structures. Contrary to his later
writings, Lacan (2006b, p. 76) situates the effect of images in
a phase that precedes the impact of language: “the I is precip-
itated in a primordial form, prior to being objectiﬁed in the
dialectic of identiﬁcation with the other, and before language
restores to it, in the universal, its function as subject.” Hence
his frequent reference to ethological research, including studies
which prove that female pigeons’ gonads only mature if a con-
gener has been seen (Lacan, 2006b, p. 77) and thus the effect of
Gestalts and mental imprinting is studied apart from the impact
of culture.
THE BUILDING BLOCKS OF THE DOUBLE-MIRROR DEVICE
Whereas Lacan’s double-mirror apparatus is primarily used in an
allegorical way to illustrate his concept of identiﬁcation2, it in
fact builds on an optical experiment by French physician Bouasse
(1947; Figure 2). Bouasse’s model illustrates the function of the
concave mirror by pointing out that a hidden ﬂower (AB) can be
projected onto an empty vase (C) if an observer (0) looks into
the mirror from a certain angle (βB′γ). What is thus created is the
illusion that there is a ﬂower (B′A′) in the vase (C). This projection
is symmetrical and reversed. In optics, such a projected image (the
ﬂower) is known as a “real image”; real because it can be projected
onto a screen.
The schema of the two mirrors is a model derived from
Bouasse’s experiment. In developing his own spatial arrangement,
Lacan adds a number of things to Bouasse’s arrangement: he swaps
the vase and the ﬂowers around (left of Figure 1); he adds a plane
mirror (A) to the middle, and onto this the image created in the
concave mirror is projected (in optics this image on the plane
mirror is a virtual image, reproduced on the right side of the
arrangement); he introduces anobserving ego (the eye as observer)
at the level of the divided subject (S/). The eye can see the image of
the vase with ﬂowers in the plane mirror, provided it looks from
the angle it is actually at in Figure 1. As can been derived from
Figures 3 and 4, Lacan’s description of the mirror set-up is opti-
cally correct, in that by watching the plane mirror from the angle
of the observing eye, the virtual image of a vase projected around
ﬂowers can indeed be seen.
WHAT LACAN AIMED TO EXPRESS WITH THE
DOUBLE-MIRROR DEVICE
In Lacan’s reasoning, each element of the arrangement repre-
sents a psychoanalytic concept. The arrangement itself consists
of two symmetrical components, with each side of the plane mir-
ror depicting a different aspect. The plane mirror (A) symbolizes
the Other (“Autre” in French). Crucial to the arrangement is the
distinction between the symbolic Other and the imaginary other.
The imaginary other is the image or picture of the other-equal in
which the ego recognizes itself. The symbolic Other, by contrast,
refers to language and discourse. Lacan’s (2006e) point, which is
2Other discussions of Lacan’s schema of the two mirrors can be found in
Depelsenaire (1986), Lew (1987), Malengreau (1985) and Pepeli (2003).
Frontiers in Psychology | Psychoanalysis and Neuropsychoanalysis September 2011 | Volume 2 | Article 209 | 2
Vanheule Lacan’s double-mirror device
FIGURE 2 | Mirror set-up in Bouasse’s experiment. Reprinted from
ECRITS by Jacques Lacan, translated by Bruce Fink. English translation
copyright © 2006, 2002 by W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. Used with
permission of the publisher, W. W. Norton & Company, Inc.
FIGURE 3 | Reconstruction of Lacan’s double-mirror set-up.
novel compared to his ideas concerning the mirror stage, is that
the Other structures and determines any relation humans can have
to reality and others qua interpersonal ﬁgure: “It would be a mis-
take to think that the Other (with a capital O) of discourse can be
absent from any distance that the subject achieves in his relation-
ship with the other, (with a lower case o) of the imaginary dyad”
(Lacan, 2006e, p. 568). Indeed, by presenting the Other as the
plane mirror in which the observing ego can see an image of itself,
Lacan, from the mid-1950s on, stresses the centrality of language
for the self-image humans can acquire. Thus considered language
use, and not the visual perception of Gestalts,mediates the acquisi-
tion of images. This implies that in Lacan’s double-mirror set-up,
“image” refers to the representations and meanings people con-
struct by using words, rather than impressions the visual system
processes; language3 determines themental representations people
3This idea is embedded in a broader theory on the centrality of language. In his
works from the mid-1950s Lacan (2006c) more broadly stressed the determining
FIGURE 4 |The projection of a virtual vase around real flowers in
Lacan’s double-mirror set-up.
discern and the relations they have with others. Lacan (2006e,
p. 568) emphasizes that this mediation via the Other of discourse
is already present in the mirror stage as a moment in develop-
ment4. Indeed, reconsidered from Lacan’s work in the mid-1950
and 1960s, it could be argued that in the mirror stage the Other
is present in the ﬁgure of the adult who is seen by the child as a
witness the moment the small child recognizes himself. The child
will typically make an appeal to the adult, who is asked to verify
the mirror image and approve it.
and structuring effect of speech on the subjective experience of reality (see Lacan,
2006c).
4Nobus (1998) correctly indicates that Lacan gradually began to reconsider the mir-
ror stage as a symbolically determined event. In his text on the mirror stage Lacan
(2006b) already referred to the structuring effects of language, discussing, for exam-
ple, Lévi-Strauss’ work on the effect of symbols (see Dunand, 1996). Nevertheless,
he maintained that the ego takes shape before language exerts its power (Lacan,
2006b, p. 76). Later on this idea changed somewhat, as he emphasized that language
mediates all imaginary phenomena: “This gradual reconsideration of the mirror
stage as a symbolically mediated event, an experience for which the presence of a
symbolic Other is also a necessary condition, coincides with the introduction and
elaboration of the ‘schema of the two mirrors.”’ (Nobus, 1998, p. 113)
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The left side of the arrangement situates the concepts that rep-
resent the divided and non-integrated being of the subject: the
ﬂowers (a) refer here to the partial drives. In Lacan’s (1988a) view
drives, like the oral and the anal drive, are partial in that they do
not make up one tendency in people’s functioning and there is
no completely satisfying object connected to them. Rather, they
confront the individual with “turbulent movements” in his own
organism and give rise to a fragmented experience of the body
(Lacan, 1988b, 2006b, p. 76).
A set-up in which only the ﬂowers are visible would represent
the phase prior to the mirror stage, when the libidinous func-
tion has not yet been normalized or structured. Lacan links the
Freudian concept of auto-eroticism to this prior stage where the
ego has not yet been formed (see Lacan, 2004b, p. 57, 140). The
drive gratiﬁcation in this stage gives rise to an“autistic jouissance5”
(Lacan, 2004b, p. 57), which is to say gratiﬁcation without the
image, without a detour via the Other. As regards the status of
the ﬂowers, Lacan employs a dichotomy both in his text on the
mirror stage and in his construction of the double mirror (e.g.,
Lacan, 2006e, p. 675). On the one hand, on the side of the child he
emphasizes“the turbulent movements with which the subject feels
he is animated” (Lacan, 2006b, p. 95), which we interpret as real
tension, a component of the drive by which the primitive subject is
characterized. On the other hand, he emphasizes the lack of motor
coordination in the young child that ties in with the structurally
premature birth, which, according to a somewhat evolutionarily
reasoning, Lacan says is peculiar to man6. Both aspects lead to a
fragmented body image and to a reaction of helplessness, or what
Freud called “Hilﬂosigkeit” (see Lacan, 2004b, p. 75, 162).
Back to the left side of Lacan’s schema, in which the divided
subject (S/) symbolizes the speaking being whose identity is con-
noted, but never denoted exactly by language. Indeed, the subject’s
place is to be found “in the elision of a signiﬁer” (Lacan, 2006e, p.
567) and in the experience of the “want-to-be” (Lacan, 2006e, p.
549), or desire, that language use produces. The hidden vase, in its
turn, represents the body qua volume or container, in which the
partial drives, as ﬂowers, will be situated. The real image i(a) of
the vase projected in the concave mirror represents the image of
the “reality of the body” (Lacan, 1966, p. 860). It is an image that
is mentally created, but that is “inaccessible to the subject’s per-
ception” (Lacan, 1966, p. 860). The concave mirror represents the
cerebral cortex Lacan (1988a, 2006e), which Lacan (2006b, p. 78)
assumed functions as “an intra-organic mirror.”
The right side of the arrangement designates a ﬁeld of ideal-
ity as observed by the ego (eye) via the Other (A). It is the ﬁeld
where the ego-ideal (I) and the ideal ego (symbolized by i′(a),
which points to the vase with ﬂowers) are situated, and where the
subject seems to have overcome its own deﬁciency and division
5As Lacan (1970, p. 194) indicates, the French term jouissance cannot be easily trans-
lated into English, which is why it is usually left in its original form. “Enjoyment”
would be its literal translation, but this term is inadequate because of the connota-
tion of pleasure it entails. For Lacan jouissance denotes a mode of satisfaction or
drive gratiﬁcation beyond pleasure. Because it primarily plays at the level of our
corporeal experience, Lacan places jouissance in dialectical opposition to language.
6“A primordial Discord betrayed by the signs of malaise and motor uncoordination
of the neonatal months” (Lacan, 2006b, p. 78); “. . . a discordance in neurological
development.” (Lacan, 2006e, p. 565)
(symbolized by S at the right upper side: the virtual subject that
is no longer divided). In short, the arrangement illustrates both
the integration of partial drives via and in the body image and the
attempt of the speaking subject to overcome his own “want-to-
be,”meaning its lack of experienced inner consistency, by trying to
resemble an idealized version of itself. The arrangement illustrates
that this imaginary process is activated parallel to the articula-
tion of the subject (S/) via the symbolic system of language. Lacan
(1988b, p. 54) describes this as follows: “the subject is no one. It is
decomposed, in pieces. And it is jammed, sucked in by the image,
the deceiving, and realized image, of the other, or equally by its
own specular image.”
This line of reasoning partially retains Lacan’s idea from the
mirror stage: an ego takes shape via recognition of and identiﬁca-
tionwith an external image that acts as ideal for the ego,and reﬂects
a uniﬁed picture. This experience allows one to also see oneself as
an entity or image in an anticipatory movement, which creates an
idea of what the ego could be, virtually and ideally. In this process
the ego implicitly assumes that it could become a consistent entity
by being aligned with the ideal ego. Lacan (1988a,b) indicates that
this identiﬁcation is accompanied by a jubilant mood given that
mastery has been achieved, but also that we are dealing here with
a misrecognition: the division of the subject and the conﬂicting
representations it is made up by are covered by the imaginary
identiﬁcation.
By stating that this process is essentially mediated via the Other
qua discourse, however, Lacan adds a new element to the reason-
ing from the mirror stage. By means of the double mirror, Lacan
demonstrates that identiﬁcation includes more than aligning the
ego to an image that is adopted via other-equals. It is a process that
is mediated symbolically: symbolic elements determine the accep-
tance of an image. Lacan calls the privileged symbolic elements
that perform an orienting function ego-ideals (I): “The ego-ideal
governs the interplay of relations on which all relations with oth-
ers depend. And on this relation to others depends the more or
less satisfying character of the imaginary structuration” (Lacan,
1988a, p. 141). In the terminology of the arrangement, these ideals
“orient” the plane mirror, which means to say that the ego-ideals
place and hold the mirror of language in its vertical position, such
that an ideal image of oneself (i′a) can be seen: the ego-ideals
make it possible for an ideal ego to be perceived. The ego-ideal
is thus linked to the ideal ego in an important way. Lacan (1964,
p. 268) states that the ego-ideal represents the point where the
subject sees himself as he is seen by others, and from where the
Other sees the subject as the subject wants to be seen. Indeed, in
his further discussion of the ego-ideals Lacan indicates that these
actually fulﬁll a dual purpose. On the one hand, they serve to reap
recognition by the Other to thus create a place in the desire of the
Other. Lacan characterizes the ego-ideal as a “privileged signiﬁer”
by which the subject “will feel himself both satisfactory and loved”
(Lacan, 1964, p. 257). By means of the ego-ideal the subject wants
to ensure himself of appreciation by the Other. On the other hand,
ego-ideals act as props with which the subject can satisfy his own
lack. In the arrangement, this is expressed by the symmetrical posi-
tion between S/ and I, and by the fact that the virtual subject (S) is
no longer divided. Ego-ideals are “based on the ego’s unconscious
coordinates” (Lacan, 2006e, p. 567), meaning on the signiﬁers that
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were used to articulate the identity of the subject. Ego-ideals also
aim to compensate for themissing signiﬁer the subject is essentially
marked by.
PSYCHOANALYTIC TREATMENT IN RELATION TO THE
DOUBLE-MIRROR DEVICE
What is important about Lacan’s double-mirror model, and his
earlier theory on the mirror stage, is that he aimed to formulate
guidelines for psychoanalytic treatment. The underlying idea was
that treatment should not focus on reinforcing the ego, but that
the ego’s tendency toward misrecognition should be taken into
account; the analyst should concentrate on the divided subject as
it comes to the fore via free association. The rotated double-mirror
set-up (Figure 5) expresses this schematically. Here, the plane mir-
ror A now gives the position of the analyst. In psychoanalytic
treatment, the analyst does not lend himself as an other-equal, as
an empathetic mirror or as an ideal ego within the ﬁeld of the
imaginary, which is expressed, inter alia, in the a-scopic position-
ing of the analyst behind the sofa. Nor does the analyst position
himself as a knowing Other who tells the subject how he must
behave in relation to the desire of the Other; he does not incarnate
the knowledge that is ascribed to himbymeans of the transference.
At both points, the analysis creates an absence. This is expressed
in the rotation of the plane mirror by 90˚, making A horizontal.
Note that this position expresses the fact that the analyst is still
the one operating through discourse A, but what is left to one
side is its identiﬁcational function. This places the discourse of
the unconscious in a central position. Via a so-called “translation
movement” (the 180˚ movement between S/1 and S/2) the subject –
understood as the effect of free association – now appears in the
place of I. In place of the hypostasized contrast S/ and I from the
classic double mirror we get a dialectic between S/1 and S/2. Lacan
points out that taking this path between S/1 and S/2 can result in
experiences of depersonalization. This is because the mirrors do
not reﬂect a unitary image on the moving subject. According to
Lacan, this depersonalization must be understood as a sign that a
FIGURE 5 | Rotated mirror set-up. Reprinted from ECRITS by Jacques
Lacan, translated by Bruce Fink. English translation copyright © 2006, 2002
byW.W. Norton & Company, Inc. Used with permission of the publisher,W.
W. Norton & Company, Inc.
step forward has been taken. They are“signs. . . of a breakthrough”
(Lacan, 2006e, p. 569).
Once the position of S/2 has been reached, the effect on the
imaginary will be double. If the subject looks toward the concave
mirror from S/2, on the one hand he will see how the virtual image
of the ﬂowers in the vase that was seen from position S/1 comes into
being. The subject that looks from S/2 is looking from the position
adopted by the observer in Bouasse’s experiment, and sees through
the illusory nature of the perceived vase. In other words: through
the translation movement, the illusory nature of the ego becomes
clear, as well as the misleading stability that the ideal ego gave to
it. On the other hand, the subject S/2, if he looks into the horizon-
tally rotated plane mirror, will still be able to see a virtual image
of the ﬂowers in the vase. This time, however, the virtual image is
perceived in all its virtuality, just like the reﬂection in the water of
a tree growing by the water’s edge is immediately perceived as a
reﬂection.
Thus considered the aim of psychoanalytic practice principally
consists of bringing about free association on the issues an indi-
vidual is troubled by, such that via the conﬂicting lines of speech
that come to the fore he obtains a different understanding of his
problems and desires, and new choices can be made: “analysis
is based on what the subject gains from assuming (assumer) his
unconscious discourse as his own” (Lacan, 2006e, p. 569). In guid-
ing this process the psychoanalyst plays a crucial role. The analyst
refrains from focusing on the ego, and positions him/herself as
the one who safeguards the unconscious (Lacan, 2006d). Indeed,
the principal role of the psychoanalyst consists of validating sig-
niﬁers and ideas in the analysant’s speech that are unexpected, or
troublesome from the perspective of the analysant’s ego. Along
this way aspects of desire that were ﬁrst denied, can be recognized
and accepted as belonging to oneself. The setting the psychoan-
alyst creates means to provide a safe space and a time-frame for
articulating such discourse, and for assuming one’s own desire.
LACAN’S DECONSTRUCTION OF THE DOUBLE-MIRROR
SET-UP
However, as time progressed Lacan gradually distanced himself
from his double-mirror set-up by highlighting its ﬂaws. This
begins in his commentary on Daniel Lagache (Lacan, 2006e), in
which he points out that the set-up dates from a time when he
focused too much on the mere contrast between the imaginary
and the symbolic (Vanheule, 2011): “my model dates back to a
preliminary stage of my teaching at which I needed to clear away
the imaginary which was overvalued in analytic technique. We
are no longer at that stage” (Lacan, 2006e, p. 571). Indeed the
early 1960s Lacan’s theoretical framework for studying questions
on psychoanalysis changes. Whereas in earlier writings he focused
on desire as articulated inside speech, and contrasted unconscious
aspects of desire with the ego’s tendency to misrecognize internal
division, attention was henceforth directed to the question of what
it is that engenders desire, and to the question of why the mirror
image plays such an important role in people’smental functioning.
To frame these questions, it is worth ﬁrst looking at the short
story Lacan tells at the beginning of Seminar X (1962–1963, p. 14),
a similar tale to which he referred in the previous year in Seminar
IX (unpublished, lesson 4/4/1962). Imagine, he says, that I am in
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a room with a giant female praying mantis 3m tall; and that I
myself am wearing the mask of an animal. The mask is one like
that of the magician from the Paleolithic cave of the “Trois Frères,”
which looks like a horned being, half-man, half-animal, and I do
not know exactly what animal I am. It is not hard to imagine, he
continues, that I would not feel entirely at ease in such a situation,
because there is a chance of the female mantis misconstruing my
identity. With a certain amount of imagination it is in fact possi-
ble to notice a similarity between the mask of the magician from
the engraving and the pointed head and antennae of a praying
mantis7.
The crucial question that Lacan raises with this Jan Fabre-esque
fable is that of the relationship between the desire of the Other and
the identity of the subject. The uncertainty regarding the behavior
of the femalemantis touchedonbyLacan – imagine she sees himas
prey, or as an enemy... or worse still: as a male mantis, whose head
is always eaten during copulation – reﬂects the structural uncer-
tainty he, as subject, endures in relation to the enigmatic intentions
of the other being with which he ﬁnds himself confronted. Here,
the female praying mantis has “a voracious desire, to which no
common factor links me”; it is an Other who is “radically Other”
(Lacan, 2004b, p. 376). In an allusion to Jacques Cazotte’s novel
The Devil in Love, Lacan says that the female mantis is radically
Other because the question: “Che-vuoi?,” meaning “What do you
want?,” cannot be answered (Lacan, 2004b, p. 14). The fact that he
does not know precisely who or what he is has a disquieting effect
here. That Lacan does not know who or what he is in relation to
the voracious female praying mantis, is given by the situation; after
all, he is wearing a mask and does not know what this mask looks
like. The compound eyes of his adversary, which, in contrast to the
eyes of vertebrates do not allow him to glimpse at his reﬂection,
perpetuate the uncertainty.
The fable illustrates nicely that the enigma of the desire of the
Other is alarming, and that uncertainty about one’s own iden-
tity increases this disquiet. We can infer from this that in Lacan’s
view the construction of a self-image has a function as an anx-
iety inhibitor. This is because by using such an image, a person
tries to see which position he/she has in the desire of the Other,
with the aim of positioning himself in relation to this. This story
tells us something about the asymmetrical contact between a giant
mantis and a masked man who does not know what mask he is
wearing, but also allows us to learn something about the symmetry
with which the neurotic approaches others: the neurotic tends to
misrecognize the Otherness of the Other, focusing on his capacity
as other-equal. Within this logic, anxiety arises to the extent that
the other cannot be positioned on the basis of one’s own image
and the activity of reﬂection is no longer sufﬁcient to localize the
other.
Lacan’smainproblemwith the schemaof the twomirrors is that
it cannot accurately express the factor that engenders both desire
and anxiety in a subject. What it fails to grasp is what he called,
7In Seminar IX the story is rather different; there Lacan presents himself as a male
mantis of around 1.75m, and thus assumes an identity that he himself recognizes.
Another clear point of difference is that he assumes that he can see himself in the
compound eyes of the insect,while in Seminar X he (correctly) states that the surface
of a compound eye has no reﬂective effect.
from the late 1950s onward, the “object a” (Lacan, 1964, 2004b,
2006e): “my models fails to shed light on object a. In depicting a
play of images, it cannot describe the function this object receives
from the symbolic” (Lacan, 2006e, p. 571). In Seminar X Lacan
deconstructs his arrangement. Step by step, he de-composes the
specular level and also takes steps in the construction of a separate
position for the object a; a position as residual object that remains
elusive for the signiﬁer and for the image (Miller, 2004). By intro-
ducing this object a it also becomes clear that his previous ideas
on mirroring processes failed to appreciate the structurally alien
nature of the object a.
Indeed, in Seminar X Lacan (2004b) actually effects a transi-
tion, whereby the schema of the two mirrors is no longer seen
as adequate. The main reason for this is that the processes that
govern desire are then reconceptualized. Whereas before Seminar
X Lacan (2006e) criticized his double-mirror set-up as it failed
to indicate what desire is directed toward, he henceforth takes a
distance from it because it radically neglects what desire is about.
What is crucial about Seminar X is that the object a is no longer the
object of desire (“objet du désir”), but the object that is the cause
of desire (“objet cause du désir”; Miller, 2004). Before Seminar X
Lacan described the object a as the mysterious dimension to which
desire is directed.An iconic example he used to explain the element
that desire anticipates is Plato’s Symposium, and more particularly
Alcibiades’s fascination for Socrates: despite the man’s ugliness,
Alcibiades is fascinated by and attracted to Socrates (Lacan, 2001).
A mystifying dimension in Socrates, something that Alcibiades
cannot explain and can only tentatively call “the agalma,” makes
Socrates attractive. In terms of the processes that govern desire,
the agalma is then described as the object a toward which desire is
directed. In Seminar X, by contrast, the object a is the dimension
that sets desire in motion. Henceforth, the object a denotes the
element in mental life that fuels desire.
The neurotic focus on objects of desire, and the belief that a
dimension of the drive, as indicated by the ﬂowers in the double-
mirror model, could be expressed in signiﬁers is thereby qualiﬁed
as illusionary. The imaginary illusion that governs neurosis – and
which is conﬁrmed in the classic double-mirror set-up – is that
the vase projected at the level of the mirror image i′(a) is capable
of containing the ﬂowers as a’ in the virtual space: “He imagines
that this vase may contain the object of his desire” (Lacan, 2004a,
p. 236). What Lacan demonstrates in Seminar X is that the object
a is resistant to this assumption, that it should not be introduced
into the game of sexual seduction; conversely it appears on an
imaginary level as an absence.
Lacan emphasizes that there is a difference between the objects
a, which are now represented in the arrangement by the real bou-
quet of ﬂowers (Lacan, 2004b, p. 139) or simply as a, and the
elements that logically correspond to them. What now appears in
the virtual space as a corresponding element is not a projection
of a. What appears instead is an element asymmetrical to this,
ﬁrst denoted as −ϕ, and later simply as X, both pointing to a
lack; to an element that cannot be imagined. This asymmetrical
reciprocal positioning of both elements also results in Lacan dis-
tancing himself from the essentially symmetrical reﬂection in the
mirror. The asymmetry is no longer understood in a mirror logic.
Hence he makes the transition to the topological ﬁgures such as
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the cross-cap, which actually allow the relationship between two
asymmetrical elements to be considered.
What Lacan appears to be illustrating with this asymmetry is
a reasoning on the status of the body for a subject (Miller, 2004).
The classic view of the mirror stage taught us that the subject pri-
marily acquires a bodily representation through mirror processes,
which is also directly understood as a characteristic of the ego. At
this level, we are dealing with the body as tangible Gestalt, as form.
The double-mirror set-up altered this view, suggesting that above
all the body is a signiﬁed entity to which humans only have access
thanks to language. This is opposed by the body as organism, as
lifelike substance. The new position from Seminar X is that the
organic aspect of the body is not entirely enveloped by the mirror
image: aspects of corporeality cannot be grasped and mastered by
means of the symbolic or by means of the imaginary. This resid-
ual component that is not mirrored, and lies radically outside the
ﬁeld of the Other, is henceforth called the object a: “the a is what
remains irreducible in this total operation of the advent of the
subject to the locus of the Other, and it is from there that it is
going to take on its function” (Lacan, 2004b, p. 189).
According to Miller (2004), the residue that thus remains must
be understood as a remainder of Triebregung.What is of particular
interest here is that Lacan (2004a, p. 22) understands this Freudian
Regung as an unruly force: “Regung is stimulation, the call to dis-
order, even to a riot.” The object a thus appears as a resistant
corporeal element that re-vitalizes the deathliness of everything
that is characterized by the orderliness of the signiﬁer. The object
a is an element that does not follow the phallic logic of the signiﬁer
(hence the characterization as negativized phallus −ϕ).
The lack of reﬂectability of the object a, represented by −ϕ and
X as its asymmetrical opposites, is combined with a typical form of
fear, which Lacan (2004b, p. 58) labels castration fear. Thus con-
sidered, castration fear is the consequence of an event in which the
empowering mirror image that radiates omnipotence is violated,
thereby suggesting that there are aspects of the drive that elude
imaginary projection. An example in which Lacan recognizes the
subject’s powerlessness in relation to corporeality is the shrinking
of the male sex organ after orgasm (detumescence). This loss of
erection is a structural fact that shows how the body remains resis-
tant to the possible further sexual intentions of the subject, which
triggers fear.
ONE STEP BEYOND THE DOUBLE-MIRROR SET-UP
In Seminar XI Lacan further elaborated his ideas on the object
a. On the one hand he characterizes this object in abstract terms
as a remainder of jouissance that cannot be signiﬁed, and as “an
accomplice of the drive” that fuels desire (Lacan, 1964, p. 69). On
the other hand Seminar XI is also of key signiﬁcance, in that he also
attempts to deﬁne the object a in operational terms, saying that in
the dimension of “the gaze” the object a is manifested. Whereas in
Seminar X Lacan is somewhat vague about the exact phenomena
in which the object a is manifested, and, for example, still deﬁnes
the phallic register as one of the domains in which the object a
takes shape, hence his example of detumescence, in Seminar XI
he discerns four objects a: the gaze, the voice, taking in nothing,
and giving nothing. In these phenomena, which he situates in the
scopic, invocative, oral, and anal drive registers respectively, Lacan
recognizes how the drive qua non-signiﬁed dimension takes shape
(Lacan, 1964; Vanheule, 2011). In the context of this paper we
solely focus on the gaze, which expresses how the scopic drive
takes shape in relation to signiﬁer-based subjectivity.
A characteristic in which Lacan (1964, p. 84) situates or detects
the gaze is the neurotic’s tendency to behave as if he/she is looked
at by others: “The gaze I encounter . . . is not a seen gaze, but a gaze
imagined by me in the ﬁeld of the Other.” The gaze determines
neurotic desire to the extent that an individual looks at him/herself
from a virtual point that is situated outside8. Questions like “what
would people think of me?” and “what if someone could see this,”
or just the idea of another person looking at oneself, make up a
continuous monitoring force that guides the neurotic in daily life.
It is a factor which brings the neurotic to ask questions about who
he actually is, how he is perceived, and how he should be per-
ceived by others. Indeed, the gaze is the reﬂective dimension from
which an individual is driven to create images of his own identity
in relation to others, and from which ego-ideals are adopted. Thus
considered the gaze has nothing to do with the eyes qua visual
organs, but concerns the ﬁgurative lens that engenders the “Che-
vuoi”-question Lacan situates at the basis of the neurotic’s relation
to the Other. What is important in this line of reasoning is that
the gaze can be considered as constituent of the self-image and
of the ideals a person lives up to. The gaze qua perspective-taking
activity “causes” or determines the selection of signiﬁers at the
level of O. This implies that the mirror of the symbolic, where the
image is constructed, is not a neutral communicative code where
components for articulating the subject can be selected, but a set of
selectively perceived elements. Moreover, the object a is not simply
a side product of linguistic articulation, an idea endorsed in Semi-
nar X (Lacan, 2004b), but the basic urge for signifying articulation
itself.
Interestingly Lacan also emphasizes that in contrast to ideals,
the object a is typically marked by lack and discord: “the object
a is most evanescent in its function of symbolizing the central
lack of desire, which I have always indicated in a univocal way by
the algorithm (−ϕ)” (Lacan, 1964, p. 105). Concerning the gaze
this implies that it is not a virtual point from which harmony in
relation to the other can be articulated. Rather, it functions as the
point from which disparity comes to the fore: “When, in love, I
solicit a look, what is profoundly unsatisfying and always missing
is that – You never look at me from the place from which I see you”
(Lacan, 1964, p. 103). The image the subject can actually convey,
and the perspective from which the other reacts, never correspond
to the gaze the subject relates to at the level of fantasy. Indeed,
in this seminar Lacan characterizes the gaze as “a strange contin-
gency” (Lacan, 1964, p. 72) that is indicative of the impossibility to
completely articulate an individual’s being in terms of the Other’s
signiﬁers, and therefore bears witness of castration. It represents a
deadlock in the tension between drive and signiﬁer.
In terms of drive-related processes, Lacan (1964, p. 195) more
broadly indicates that the gaze is central to scopic drive gratiﬁca-
tion, and that its main activity consists of “making oneself seen”
8Lacan suggests that in psychosis the object a has a different position in that it does
not function as an external element, but as a dimension that hunts the subject from
within (see Vanheule, 2011).
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(“se faire voire” in French). On a continuum between hiding away
and exhibiting oneself in relation to actual or virtual onlookers the
gaze takes shape. On the one hand the gaze determines signifying
articulation, but on the other hand also produces a drive gratiﬁ-
cation that cannot be understood in terms of signiﬁers alone. It
is precisely this last dimension that cannot be grasped in terms
of the double mirror, which is why Lacan leaves this schema
behind.
Parallel to the discontent he expressed toward his own schema
of the two mirrors, from the mid-1960s Lacan also began to refor-
mulate his ideas on the goal and ﬁnality of psychoanalytic practice.
He proposed that psychoanalytic treatment should not merely
focus on reading unconscious desire, such that the analysant can
assume the desire his speech bears witness of. The more crucial
question is what it is that makes up a person’s desirous position.
But rather than focusing on desire as such, the question shifts to
the analysant’s relation to the desire of the Other and the object
a. Indeed, from Seminar XI onward Lacan aims to deﬁne psycho-
analytic treatment as a process in which the relation between a
subject and its objects a needs to be reworked: “the object a . . .
is presented precisely, in the ﬁeld of the mirage of the narcissistic
function of desire, as the object that cannot be swallowed, as it
were, which remains stuck in the gullet of the signiﬁer. It is at this
point of lack that the subject has to recognize himself” (Lacan,
1964, p. 270). Recognizing oneself in one’s relation to objects a,
and changing aspects of this relation, is a challenge for psycho-
analytic treatment he henceforth places next to deciphering the
unconscious and articulating desire.
The main clinical concepts Lacan uses to address this challenge
are “fantasy” and “traversing the fantasy.” While this concept can
already be found in the work of Freud and Klein, Lacan’s inter-
pretation of “fantasy” is speciﬁc (Fink, 1996; Žižek, 1998; Miller,
2002). In his view, fantasy is the neurotic’s answer to the riddle of
the Other’s desire, and a way of constituting a place for the subject
in relation to the object a. Traversing the fantasy, in its turn,means
that through ongoing free association, the positions the analysant
has been occupying in relation to the object a are mapped with
the aim of enabling different positions toward the Other’s desire
and toward the object a. The fantasy is traversed with the aim of
breaking the repetitive cycle of incarnating the same position in
relation to the Other and to the object a. It was precisely in con-
ceptualizing the idea of traversing the fantasy that Lacan moved
away from his schema of the two mirrors in favor of topological
ﬁgures.
CONCLUSION
In this paper I discussed Lacan’s double-mirror set-up. Situating
its basis in his preceding theory on themirror stage, and in an opti-
cal experiment by Henri Bouasse, I argued that in the 1950s Lacan
developed this device with the aim of formulating a theory on
identiﬁcation and of articulating principles on how the ego’s ten-
dency for misrecognition should be addressed in psychoanalytic
practice. However, from the early 1960s onward, as his inquiries
shift toward understanding what fuels desire rather than describ-
ing how desire is articulated in signiﬁers, Lacan left this scheme
behind. Arguing that a crucial aspect of drive-related functioning
cannot be understood in terms of signiﬁers, but should be stud-
ied in terms of a dialectical tension between drive and signiﬁer,
he then focused on so-called objects a, of which the gaze is one
example. To graphically represent his line of reasoning on the rela-
tionship between subject and object a, Lacan shifts to topological
models, like the interior eight and the Möbius strip (Lacan, 1964,
unpublished). He is particularly interested in such geometrical
ﬁgures because of the ambiguous and non-symmetrical relations
between inside and outside, or underside and top they imply.
Focusing on the status of the double mirror in Lacan’s work,
many other questions remain unaddressed in the present paper.
Similarities and differences between Lacan’s use of mirror ter-
minology and other psychoanalysts’ use of such concepts, and
the relevance of the double mirror for exploring clinical prob-
lems have not been addressed here (for examples see Vanheule
and Verhaeghe, 2005, 2009). Also, the relevance of Lacan’s model
for developmental psychology (Verhaeghe, 2004), issues on the
phenomenology of perception (Kusnierek, 2008), or neuropsy-
chological problems (Morin et al., 2003), has not been discussed.
Most importantly I believe that the relevance and the limits of
Lacan’s double-mirror set-up for organizing and understanding
the process of psychoanalytic treatment, and the transition it pro-
duces, needs to be studied further. Case studies could thereby be
of key signiﬁcance.
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